Bow Tie Kreative SECURITY Grammar

The grammar

Volumetric matrix

10 internal variables crossed with five change levels, read through 14 measurement meta-variables — magnitude, rate, direction, scope, depth and more. A checklist asks whether a control exists. The volumetric matrix asks how the control behaves across variables, meta-variables and five change levels.

This material is a defensive specification and reference set. It is not an attack tool, a scanner, a certification, or evidence of a completed assessment. It does not automate exploitation; active or state-changing operations require a valid authorization manifest, an in-scope target, an allowed mode, verified preconditions and verified rollback.

5 Change levels
10 Internal variables
14 Meta-variables
50 Matrix cells

The five change levels

The five change levels. Source: docs/02-volumetric-matrix.md.
LevelMeaningSecurity expression
BaselineEstablish visibility and minimum controlKnow what exists, who owns it, what is exposed, and whether minimum controls work.
Minor changeTune existing controlsClose ports, correct permissions, rotate keys, add alerts, tighten headers, shorten retention.
Major changeReplace or redesign componentsMigrate auth, segment networks, change backup architecture, rebuild images, replace shared credentials.
Structural changeAlter trust boundaries and operating modelImmutable deployment, separate management plane, per-client runners, zero-trust access, isolated evidence stores.
Paradigm changeMake security adaptive and policy-drivenContinuous verification, signed policy-as-code, automated drift response, measured recovery, threat-informed control mutation.

The 14 meta-variables

Magnitude

how much change or harm?

Rate

how quickly?

Direction

moving toward what?

Scope

how broadly?

Depth

how fundamentally?

Duration

for how long?

Frequency

how often?

Acceleration

is the rate increasing or decreasing?

Variability

how consistent or unpredictable?

Detectability

how visible and measurable?

Reversibility

can it be undone?

Propagation

how does it spread?

Amplification

what makes the effect larger?

Accumulation

what builds up over time?

The chapter in full

2. Volumetric matrix

2.1 Five change levels

LevelMeaningSecurity expression
BaselineEstablish visibility and minimum controlKnow what exists, who owns it, what is exposed, and whether minimum controls work.
Minor changeTune existing controlsClose ports, correct permissions, rotate keys, add alerts, tighten headers, shorten retention.
Major changeReplace or redesign componentsMigrate auth, segment networks, change backup architecture, rebuild images, replace shared credentials.
Structural changeAlter trust boundaries and operating modelImmutable deployment, separate management plane, per-client runners, zero-trust access, isolated evidence stores.
Paradigm changeMake security adaptive and policy-drivenContinuous verification, signed policy-as-code, automated drift response, measured recovery, threat-informed control mutation.

2.2 Internal-variable matrix

VariableBaselineMinor changeMajor changeStructural changeParadigm change
ObjectEnumerate drives, hosts, apps, identities, data, dependenciesCorrect labels, owners, criticality, lifecycleSplit high-risk objects; replace unsupported assetsRebuild boundaries around tenants and management planesTreat every asset as an ephemeral, attestable security object
ConditionsRecord environment, exposure, privilege, backup, maintenance stateAdd missing context and exception expiryRedesign operating conditions to remove unsafe assumptionsMake policy derive from environment and trust boundaryContinuously infer context and re-evaluate authorization
ActionsInventory, audit, patch, back upTune, rotate, restrict, alertMigrate, rebuild, segment, re-keyOrchestrate canaries, immutable changes, isolated recoveryClosed-loop plan-test-change-verify-learn
ToolsBasic OS tools and passive scannersCentralize versions, configs, parsersReplace manual scripts with controlled runnersSeparate read-only, active-test, and change execution planesAttested disposable workers selected by policy
ResourcesAsset list, owner, credentials, backupsBetter telemetry and runbooksDedicated security data store and staging clonePer-client infrastructure and out-of-band recoveryDynamically allocated evidence, models, and simulation environments
OutcomesMinimum controls visibleFewer gaps and faster detectionReduced attack paths and blast radiusFailure contained by architectureMeasurable resilience and adaptive control effectiveness
FeedbackTickets and periodic reviewAutomated retests and drift alertsArchitecture decisions informed by recurring findingsControl failures trigger safe isolation or rollbackFeedback changes profiles, priorities, and test selection continuously
ConstraintsLegal scope, uptime, privacy, budgetExplicit rate, time, and change ceilingsRework incompatible systems and contractsEncode constraints as policy and tenant boundariesConstraints become machine-verifiable preconditions
ValueAvoid preventable compromiseReduce toil and client uncertaintyProtect revenue, data, and recovery capabilityMake client security scalable and provableSecurity becomes a continuously measured service quality
Failure modeUnknown assets, missed patches, weak backupsFalse positives, alert fatigue, stale exceptionsMigration error, lockout, dependency breakageControl-plane compromise, shared-tenant failureAutomation amplifies a bad policy unless governed and reversible

2.3 The 14 LAKA meta-variables applied to security

Magnitude — how much change or harm?

0 none
1 local configuration effect
2 single service or dataset effect
3 host/application effect
4 tenant/client effect
5 multi-client/platform effect

Measure both change magnitude and plausible incident magnitude. A one-line firewall change may have platform-scale impact.

Rate — how quickly?

Track:

patch latency
credential revocation latency
mean time to detect
mean time to acknowledge
mean time to contain
mean time to restore
control drift rate

Direction — moving toward what?

secure / insecure
known / unknown
isolated / connected
least privilege / privilege expansion
recoverable / unrecoverable
verified / assumed

Scope — how broadly?

file -> process -> container -> host -> network -> tenant -> client portfolio

Scope must distinguish intended coverage from actual coverage.

Depth — how fundamentally?

surface observation
configuration verification
authenticated control test
business-logic test
architecture/trust-boundary test
recovery and adversarial resilience test

Greater depth requires stronger authorization and safety controls.

Duration — for how long?

Track control lifetime, authorization lifetime, exception lifetime, credential lifetime, evidence retention, outage duration, and exposure duration.

Frequency — how often?

Use event-driven checks where possible:

on commit
on image build
on deployment
on DNS/certificate change
on package advisory
on new KEV signal
on privilege change
on backup completion
on incident state change

Periodic scans remain useful for blind spots but should not be the only feedback loop.

Acceleration — is the rate increasing or decreasing?

Examples:

  • findings accumulating faster than remediation;
  • login failures accelerating;
  • disk errors increasing;
  • patch latency worsening;
  • certificate expiry risk approaching nonlinearly;
  • repeated drift after each deployment.

Acceleration is often a better early-warning signal than absolute count.

Variability — how consistent or unpredictable?

Measure variability of deployment configuration, restore time, log volume, vulnerability count, performance under tests, and administrative behavior. High variability may indicate unmanaged snowflake systems or unstable controls.

Detectability — how visible and measurable?

0 no telemetry
1 indirect symptom
2 periodic visibility
3 near-real-time event
4 attributed, correlated, and reproducible evidence
5 pre-impact warning with tested response

A preventive control with no failure signal is incomplete.

Reversibility — can it be undone?

fully reversible by config rollback
reversible by snapshot or restore
reversible with data loss
not safely reversible
time-sensitive reversibility

Encryption, key deletion, storage reformatting, firewall changes, and account revocation require explicit reversibility analysis.

Propagation — how does it spread?

Map:

credential reuse
shared images
CI/CD artifacts
network trust
DNS delegation
package dependencies
backup replication
administrative automation
multi-tenant control planes

Amplification — what makes the effect larger?

Common amplifiers:

  • root or cloud-owner privilege;
  • public exposure;
  • shared secrets;
  • wildcard credentials;
  • centralized automation;
  • unbounded concurrency;
  • write access to backups;
  • lack of segmentation;
  • a trusted signed but compromised artifact.

Accumulation — what builds up over time?

Track technical debt, stale accounts, exceptions, unsupported packages, unused firewall rules, untested backups, orphaned DNS, vulnerable images, secrets in history, and unresolved low-severity findings that form an attack chain.

2.4 Volumetric vector

Represent every control, finding, or change as a vector rather than a binary:

volume:
  magnitude: 3
  rate: "2 affected hosts/hour"
  direction: "toward least privilege"
  scope: [client-acme, production, web-tier]
  depth: "authenticated configuration verification"
  duration: "permanent control; quarterly review"
  frequency: "on deployment + daily"
  acceleration: "stable"
  variability: "one host differs from image baseline"
  detectability: 4
  reversibility: "snapshot + configuration rollback"
  propagation: [golden-image, ansible-role]
  amplification: [public-exposure, privileged-service]
  accumulation: "three unresolved drift events in 30 days"

2.5 Security maturity is not one number

Maintain a profile with separate axes:

GOVERNANCE
ASSET KNOWLEDGE
IDENTITY
HOST
NETWORK
APPLICATION
DATA
DETECTION
RESPONSE
RECOVERY
EVIDENCE QUALITY
AUTOMATION SAFETY

A system can be strong in patching and weak in recovery. Averaging those into one score can hide a fatal gap. Dashboards should show the shape of the security volume, not only its mean.

2.6 Five-state measurement for each control

UNKNOWN     no current evidence
ABSENT      evidence shows the control is not implemented
PARTIAL     some objects or conditions are covered
VERIFIED    current evidence satisfies the objective
RESILIENT   failure is detected, contained, and recovery is tested

An exception is not a sixth “safe” state. It is a treatment record attached to an absent or partial control, with owner and expiry.

The matrix as JSON →