Bow Tie Kreative SECURITY Grammar

LAKA Volumetric Security Grammar · version 1.0.0

Security, written as grammar.

A checklist asks whether a control exists. A volumetric grammar asks how that control behaves — across 10 internal variables, 14 measurement meta-variables and five change levels, from baseline visibility to paradigm change. Every operation is a full sentence, and every active operation passes an authorization gate first.

This is a defensive, authorization-first reference. It does not automate exploitation; the default answer to any unauthorized, out-of-scope or unverified operation is no.

The unit of analysis

The SECURITY_UNIT

Every assessed thing is described with the same 16-component sentence. A unit missing its authorization, owner or failure mode is incomplete by definition.

SECURITY_UNIT =
  OBJECT + CONDITION + THREAT + WEAKNESS + CONTROL + ACTION + TOOL
  + EVIDENCE + OUTCOME + FEEDBACK + CONSTRAINT + FAILURE_MODE
  + AUTHORIZATION + OWNER + TIME + CHANGE_LEVEL
OBJECT
CONDITION
THREAT
WEAKNESS
CONTROL
ACTION
TOOL
EVIDENCE
OUTCOME
FEEDBACK
CONSTRAINT
FAILURE_MODE
AUTHORIZATION
OWNER
TIME
CHANGE_LEVEL

The governing production rule

Authorization first. Deny by default.

One rule governs every operation the grammar can describe. It is served as code at POST /v1/authorize-check — give it the state of the five gates and it returns allow or deny, with the failed conditions named.

IF authorized
AND target_is_in_scope
AND mode_is_allowed
AND preconditions_are_true
AND rollback_is_verified_when_change_is_possible
THEN execute_the_least_invasive_action
USING an_allowlisted_tool
WITH rate_limits + timeout + evidence_capture + kill_switch
ELSE deny_and_record_the_reason

authorized

A current, signed authorization manifest covers the operation.

target_in_scope

The target is explicitly listed in the manifest for the environment in question.

mode_allowed

The execution mode (inventory, audit, passive, active, change) is allowed by the manifest.

preconditions_true

All declared preconditions hold — ownership proof, rate limits, kill switch, maintenance window where required.

rollback_verified

Where the operation can change state, rollback and backup/restore evidence is verified first.

What is in the package

15 Chapters
8 JSON Schemas
7 Worked examples
9 Deny rules

Counts derive from the corpus at load time: 15 chapters, 8 document schemas, 7 schema-conformant worked examples, 9 deny-first policy rules, 10 adopted standards and 8 registered tool classes — all served at /v1.

Three planes of work

Observe. Verify. Change.

Passive verification

Continuous read-only observation: inventory, audit, monitoring, drift detection and evidence capture. Always on, never mutating.

Operations →

Controlled active testing

Authorized, rate-limited, evidence-capturing verification of client-owned targets — gated by a signed manifest, exact scope and a kill switch.

Hardening domains →

Guarded change

Configuration change only inside a maintenance window, with verified backup, verified rollback and lockout-risk acknowledgement.

Operating model →

Read this before you use it

A defensive reference, not an attack tool.

A specification and reference set — not an attack tool, a scanner, a certification or a completed assessment. It does not automate exploitation. Active or state-changing operations require a valid authorization manifest, an in-scope target, an allowed mode, verified preconditions and verified rollback.

Adopted standards →